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Nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates have increased very rapidly over the last couple of decades.  In 1980, roughly 
15 of every 10,000 Americans filed for bankruptcy protection.   By 2004, that number had reached 54 of every 
10,000 Americans.  These alarming increases in bankruptcy filing rates over the last decade were largely the impetus 
for the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which went into effect in October, 2005. A 
substantial literature already exists that seeks to determine the causes of personal bankruptcy, but critical holes in the 
literature remain.  In particular, existing studies offer only weak inferences about the role of stigma in explaining the 
decision to file for bankruptcy or in explaining regional variation in bankruptcy filing rates.  I enhance the existing 
literature by using innovative approaches to measuring the effects of age and geography, traditional proxies for 
stigma, and by utilizing a novel proxy for stigma, namely, religious adherence.  There is also a lack of consensus on 
the effects of gambling on bankruptcy, with most research finding no statistically significant relationships.  I utilize 
a unique measure of proximity to gambling establishments and subsequently find more definitive results.  The 
existing literature lacks consensus on the effects of homestead exemptions as well, with some finding positive 
effects, some finding negative effects, and still others finding no effects.  I assert that the explanation of these 
inconsistent results may lie in endogeneity, and therefore I estimate two-stage models that effectively instrument for 
homestead exemptions.  In addition, I explore the effects on bankruptcy filing rates of factors generally left out of 
existing studies, including small business and self-employment, a full distribution of age and income, more narrow 
demographic definitions, disability, lack of health insurance, public assistance, housing and vehicle choices,  and 
additional information on debts and debt service. 
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1. Introduction 
Nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates have increased very rapidly over the last couple of 
decades.  In 1980, roughly 15 of every 10,000 Americans filed for bankruptcy protection (Figure 
1).
1  By 2004, that number had reached 54 of every 10,000 Americans, for a compound annual 
growth rate of 5.6 percent.  These alarming increases in bankruptcy filing rates over the last 
decade were largely the impetus for the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act, which went into effect in October, 2005.  
From 1960 – 1979, nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates increased at a much slower 2.3 
percent annual pace.  Bankruptcy reform legislation passed in 1978 often is given the blame for 
the acceleration in growth of filing rates in recent decades.  However, passage of the legislation 
should have lead to a one-time jump in the bankruptcy filing rate (a change in intercept in Figure 
1) rather than an increase in the growth rate of bankruptcy filings (a change in slope in Figure 1).  
More likely is that a combination of several factors is responsible for accelerating growth in 
bankruptcy filing rates in the last couple of decades.  Indeed, Congress expressed its concerns 
about the underlying causes of bankruptcy in developing the 2005 law. 
While bankruptcy filing rates have climbed consistently in the aggregate over time, there 
is considerable variation across regions (Figure 2).  In 2000, for example, non-business 
bankruptcy filing rates in counties with over 50,000 population ranged from only 0.2 per 10,000 
people in Bibb County, GA (Macon) to 155 per 10,000 people in Shelby County, TN (Memphis).  
The lack of uniformity in bankruptcy filing rates across counties (and states) suggests that 
regional factors likely play a key role in the determination of filing rates. 
                                                 
1 Data on bankruptcy filing rates were available from two sources that are unfortunately inconsistent with each 
other.  Both series are presented in Figure 1.  I consider the data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(with Census Bureau population data) to be more reliable and therefore focus on these data when possible. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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A substantial literature already exists that seeks to determine the causes of personal 
bankruptcy, but critical holes in the literature remain.  In particular, existing studies offer only 
weak inferences about the role of stigma in explaining the decision to file for bankruptcy or in 
explaining regional variation in bankruptcy filing rates.  I enhance the existing literature by using 
innovative approaches to measuring the effects of age and geography, traditional proxies for 
stigma, and by utilizing a novel proxy for stigma, namely, religious adherence.  There is also a 
lack of consensus on the effects of gambling on bankruptcy, with most research finding no 
statistically significant relationships.  I utilize a unique measure of proximity to gambling 
establishments and subsequently find more definitive results.  The existing literature lacks 
consensus on the effects of homestead exemptions as well, with some finding positive effects, 
some finding negative effects, and still others finding no effects.  I assert that the explanation of 
these inconsistent results may lie in endogeneity, and therefore I estimate two-stage models that 
effectively instrument for homestead exemptions.  In addition, I explore the effects on 
bankruptcy filing rates of factors generally left out of existing studies, including small business 
and self-employment, a full distribution of age and income, more narrow demographic 
definitions, disability, lack of health insurance, public assistance, housing and vehicle choices,  
and additional information on debts and debt service. 
Many of the existing studies use data on individuals in an effort to examine the individual 
decision to file for bankruptcy. Others utilize geographically aggregated data, such as county-
level or state-level data, to explore the reasons why bankruptcy filing rates differ across the 
country. This study falls in the latter category.  Specifically, I use a cross-section of all counties 
in the United States for the year 2000.   Panel data on bankruptcy filings are available through 
2003; however, many of the variables included in this analysis are available only for 2000 or are 
available only every ten years (including 2000).  The goal here is to be as comprehensive as 
possible in choosing independent regressors, and hence the benefits of using a large number of 
regressors, which is possible only in a cross-section, were deemed to exceed the added benefit of 
time-series variation and additional degrees of freedom. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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2.  Model and Data 
  The basic model employed in this study is one of bankruptcy filing rates per 10,000 
households.  The units of observation are U.S. counties and data are from the year 2000.  
Numerous potential determinants are included in the model and are described below.  The 
emphasis of the study is on the effects on bankruptcy filing rates of asset exemptions, wage 
garnishment laws, proximity to gambling establishments, and proxies for social stigma, but 
numerous other regressors are included in the model in an effort to make it comprehensive.  Data 
descriptions, sources, and simple statistics are presented in Table 1. 
Exemption Levels 
Each state has established a homestead exemption (EH, which in some cases is zero), 
which limits the amount of home equity that must be used to pay unsecured debt under 
bankruptcy.
2  For a house valued at V, the total amount of home equity to be allocated to pay 
unsecured debt would then be V – EH.  In the case of a mortgage foreclosure, proceeds from the 
sale of the house would be allocated (until exhausted) first to the transactions costs associated 
with the foreclosure, then to the first mortgage, then to the second mortgage.  Of any remainder, 
only the amount in excess of EH would be used to pay unsecured debt. 
Homestead exemptions allow bankruptcy filers to have higher post-bankruptcy 
consumption than would be the case in the absence of exemptions.  Because non-exempt assets 
(such as deposit accounts) are easily converted to home equity (e.g., by selling assets and paying 
off mortgage debt), high homestead exemptions offer protection for all kinds of wealth, not just 
actual homesteads.  Empirical evidence suggests that some high asset households move to high 
(homestead) exemption states to make such a conversion of assets (Brinig and Buckley, 1996; 
                                                 
2 The homestead exemption generally would apply in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.   However, if there is such significant 
equity in the house that the creditors of the Debtor would be better off if the Debtor filed a Chapter 7 rather than a 
Chapter 13, the Debtor could argue that because of his entitlement to a homestead exemption, the equity is of 
inconsequential value.  Further, if the Debtor has equity in his home, sells the home during the case, and the 
proceeds are required to be paid into his Chapter 13 plan, the Debtor would be entitled to assert his homestead 
exemption in the proceeds ahead of the Chapter 13 estate's interest. 
 DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Elul and Subramanian, 2002).  Homestead exemptions lower the cost of filing for bankruptcy, 
and therefore higher exemption levels should be expected to lead to higher filing rates, all else 
equal. 
Most states include numerous other asset exemptions besides homestead exemptions.  
These are impossible to value in any uniform way across states because the exemptions generally 
are for specific items, such as wedding rings, livestock, and clothing.  Some states provide both 
specific property exemptions and dollar value limits for these items, however, and Dawsey and 
Ausubel (2001) take advantage of this information in an attempt to get around the personal 
property exemption valuation problem.  They use the value limits provided in a limited number 
of states to value personal property exemptions in all states.  Despite this clever approach, 
Dawsey and Ausubel are unable to get “consistent results” for personal property exemptions and 
therefore “follow previous studies and focus on the homestead exemption” (17).  Personal 
property exemptions are not included in the present model because of a lack of confidence in the 
valuation.  Further, there is some tendency for personal property exemptions and real property 
exemptions to move together as one surveys the states.  The correlation coefficient in the 
Dawsey and Ausubel data is 0.241.  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between homestead exemption levels and 
bankruptcy filing rates is somewhat limited and mixed in its conclusions.   
Peterson and Aoki (1984) created dummy variables based on the generosity of state 
exemptions in 1980, representing the following categories: very high, high, low, and very low.  
“Low” states had exemptions that were more restrictive than federal exemptions (under the 1978 
law), while “high” states had exemptions that were more generous than federal exemptions.  The 
left out category was for states that did not have their own exemptions, but rather relied on 
federal exemption standards. 
Surprisingly, Peterson and Aoki found positive coefficients for all of the dummy 
variables, three of which were significant, meaning that having state exemption rules increased 
bankruptcy filing rates in 1980, regardless of whether the state exemptions were more or less DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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restrictive than the federal standards.  The authors suggest that this result may reflect a reverse 
causality in that the over-riding of the federal law with more restrictive exemptions was likely a 
response to especially elevated bankruptcy filing rates, a notion that is supported by the data.  
That is, states with higher bankruptcy filing rates were more likely to impose more restrictive 
exemption rules.  The positive coefficient on high exemptions can be explained by would-be 
filers responding to reduced costs of filing. 
Apilado et al. (1978) and Shiers and Williamson (1987) both produce the unusual finding 
that higher exemption levels lead to fewer bankruptcies.  The explanation given by Shiers and 
Williamson is that the amount of credit issued to high risk borrowers is lower in states with high 
exemptions.  In point of fact, Gropp et al. (1997) find that the size of a state’s bankruptcy 
homestead exemption has a (statistically and economically) significant positive effect on the 
probability that potential borrowers in the state will be denied credit.  Of course, if the results of 
Apilado et al. and Shiers and Williamson are reflective of the true relationship between asset 
exemptions and bankruptcy filings, the effect of restrictive credit practices would have to more 
than offset the stimulus to bankruptcies of lower filing costs.  Another possible explanation for a 
negative relationship between the level of asset exemptions and bankruptcy filing rates is that the 
direction of causality goes the other way.  It may well be that states with relatively high 
bankruptcy filing rates keep exemptions low to keep the incentives to file for bankruptcy low and 
that states with relatively low filing rates are more inclined to be generous with exemptions. 
White (1987) finds a positive relationship between homestead exemption levels and 
Chapter 7 filing rates, but a negative effect of homestead exemptions on Chapter 13 filings.  
Using individual data on credit card holders, Agarwal et al. (2003) find a positive relationship 
between homestead exemptions and the decision to file for bankruptcy.  In some states, 
homestead and personal property exemptions apply uniformly in and outside of formal 
bankruptcy (see Woodward, 1982), which may diminish the relationship between homestead 
exemptions and bankruptcy. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Lin and White (2001) argue that since few states change their exemption levels each year 
(11 over the period 1992 – 1997), “individual states’ bankruptcy exemptions can be treated as 
exogenous in the model” (151).  Supporting this view, in cross-sectional regressions using 1996 
data, Posner et al. 2001 were able to explain 23 percent to 68 percent of the variation in 
exemption laws across states, depending on the specification of the dependent variable.  But the 
only variable of any significance in the regressions was “history,” defined as the homestead 
exemption in that state in 1920.  This result changed little using pooled regressions over the 
period 1975 – 1996.  Nevertheless, given the potential duality in the direction of causality, it may 
be important to instrument for exemptions, which I accomplish with two-stage models that 
utilize both county and state-level data.   
Information on homestead exemptions (for a married couple) were collected from a 
search of the bankruptcy codes for all 50 states and the District of Columbia relevant for the year 
2000.  A variable was then created for each county to reflect the homestead exemption in its state 
(or its predicted value) as a fraction of the median house value in the county.  Six states (Florida, 
Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas) had exemptions that were unlimited in 
value (but limited in acreage, e.g., the exemption might be for 40 acres and improvements).  The 
homestead exemptions in these states are given a value of $1,000,000, which should cover most 
homesteads given that bankruptcy filers come predominantly from the bottom half of the income 
distribution in their states (White, 2005).  Further, a dummy variable (HSD) is created to 
represent these states, taking on a value of unity for states with unlimited exemptions and zero 
otherwise.   For other states, the value of the homestead exemption in 2000 (the data year for this 
study) ranged from $2,500 (Maryland) to $200,000 (Minnesota), with the mean exemption of 
states with limited exemptions of $43,967.
3  In 2005, the average exemption, excluding states 
with unlimited exemptions, is $63,527 and ranges from $5,000 (Alabama, Kentucky, and 
Maryland) to $500,000 (Massachusetts). 
                                                 
3 This average includes the value of the Federal homestead exemption ($15,000 in 2000) for states where the state 
exemption is less than the federal exemption, but petitioners have the option of taking the federal exemption. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Social Stigma 
Declining social stigma often has been put forth as a reason why bankruptcies have 
increased at such a rapid rate in the United States over the last several years.  In testimony before 
Congress, for example, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that “personal 
bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame.”
4  The effects of 
social stigma on bankruptcy filing propensities are probably impossible to estimate empirically 
in any direct way because stigma cannot be directly measured, but the effects often can be 
inferred from other empirical results.   
Livshits et al. (2005) use an applied general equilibrium to get around the measurement 
problem, incorporating a utility cost to bankruptcy in their model.  They find that greater stigma 
reduces the number of filings, but increases borrowing ex ante and generates “much more 
desperate bankrupts” (28).  Gross and Souleles (2002) use a panel of individual credit card 
accounts to investigate credit card delinquency and the decision to file for bankruptcy.  They find 
that a credit card holder in 1997 was almost one percentage point more likely to file for 
bankruptcy than an individual with similar characteristics in 1995, a result they compare to the 
entire population of card holders becoming one standard deviation riskier. Gross and Souleles 
suggest that the increased demand for bankruptcy may be attributable to a decline in social 
stigma, but they give equal validity to the idea that information costs may have declined.  
To the extent that social stigma varies regionally, geographic variables will at least partly 
pick up the differences.  This is essentially the approach used in Fay et al. (2002).  The study 
utilizes data on individuals from the PSID, and the authors suggest that the lagged bankruptcy 
rate in the state in which a household resides may be an inverse proxy for stigma experienced by 
that household.  Their results suggest that the probability of filing for bankruptcy decreases with 
the degree of social stigma.  The authors also note that localization of bankruptcy filing might 
                                                 
4 Cited in Julie Kosterlitz, 1997 (May 3), “'Over the Edge,”' National Journal, 29(18), 871. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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reflect information flow: “[t]heir friends and relatives will probably tell them that filing for 
bankruptcy is quick and easy” (710).   
In the present study a number of measures of stigma are used with the hope that the 
combination of results will lead to a more definitive answer to the stigma question.   
Geographic variables, or more generally, neighborhood effects, are used to explain 
regional patterns in bankruptcy filing rates, which at least in part should pick up the effects of 
stigma.  The simplest way this is accomplished is by including a set of dummy variables for the 
eight regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  A second way is by including a 
spatial autoregressive term, a procedure explained in some detail below.  As shown in Figure 2, 
there are strong patterns in bankruptcy filing rates across counties throughout the United States, 
with especially high concentrations in the Southeast and lower Midwest. 
  Another way I pick up stigma is by including a set of variables reflecting adherence to 
various religious groups within each county, under the assumption that different religions have 
different views on the acceptability of defaulting on debt payments and filing for bankruptcy.  
For example, the repayment of debts is a paramount moral obligation in Islam.
5  Further, Islam is 
commonly thought to prohibit the charging or paying of interest (see El-Gamal, 2001), which 
likely results in less borrowing, and hence fewer bankruptcies.  The repayment of debts is a 
virtue in the Judeo-Christian tradition as well,
6  but at the same time, perhaps the most important 
tenet of the Christian religion is forgiveness.
7  Similarly, Jewish tradition, as outlined by the Old 
Testament, insists on the forgiveness of debts every seven years (Deuteronomy 15:1-2).  This 
suggests that bankruptcy, while subject to some stigma in the Judeo-Christian traditions, may not 
receive the same condemnation by Jews and Christians as by Muslims.   A central theme in  
many Eastern religions is the avoidance of injury to others.  Thus, there is likely to be stigma 
attached to any injurious action, including bankruptcy and defaulting on debts.  Further, in most 
                                                 
5 Consider the following verses, for example: “O you who believe! Fulfill (your) obligations” (Al-Maa’idah 5:1) and 
“Verily! Allah commands that you should render back the trusts to whom they are due . . . ” (An-Nisaa 4:58). 
6 Consider, for example, the passage from Psalms 37:21 (KJV): “The wicked borroweth, and payeth not again.” 
7 The Lord’s Prayer entreats God to “forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors” (Matthew 6:12, KJV, 
emphasis added). DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Eastern religions, karma has a critical place: all deeds have consequences, or “you reap what you 
sew.”  A default on debts would likely generate bad karma that would have to be paid in either 
this life or a future life.  The model includes as one measure of stigma the share of the population 
in each county that adheres to Catholicism, an Eastern religion such as Hinduism or Buddhism, 
Islam, Judaism, Mormonism (LDS), Orthodox Christianity, Unitarian Universalism, and 
Protestantism. 
A final measure of stigma included in the model is the age distribution.  VISA (1996) 
argues that younger age cohorts may view bankruptcy with less stigma than older groups, and 
they find a statistically significant positive relationship between bankruptcy filing rates and the 
share of the population that is 25 – 44, which supports this view.  Flynn and Bermant (2003) 
show 25 – 44 to be the “peak years” for filing for bankruptcy as well, and Domowitz and Eovaldi 
(1993) also find a positive association between bankruptcy filing rates and the proportion of the 
population that is 25 – 44.  I include the entire age distribution of each county in the analysis in 
part to pick up the effects of stigma.   
Of course, there are other ways that age distribution might influence bankruptcy filing 
rates as well, including by reflecting income and consumption patterns (VISA, 1996).  Although 
traditionally younger people have made the bulk of the bankruptcy petitions, the pool is 
becoming increasingly older, and middle-aged people make up a significant part of the increase 
in filings over the last couple of decades (Figure 3).  Fay et al. (2002) find that the probability of 
filing for bankruptcy increases with the age of the head-of-household but decreases with squared 
age.  They suggest that bankruptcy filings first pick up with age because access to credit 
increases with age, but the effect of age reverses course later in life when households often have 
accumulated wealth and do not need as much access to credit. White (1987) did not find a 
significant relationship between bankruptcy and the proportion of the population that is elderly. 
Wage Garnishments 
When an individual or married couple files for bankruptcy protection, future earnings are 
protected from garnishment.  The idea behind this exemption is to give bankruptcy filers a “fresh DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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start” and to provide proper work incentives for filers following discharge.  Because of this, 
wage garnishment often spurs bankruptcy filings.  Naturally, the lower the amount of an 
individual’s wages that can be legally garnished, the less is his incentive to file for bankruptcy 
protection.  Hence, bankruptcy filing rates, all else equal, are expected to be negatively related to 
the proportion of wages protected from garnished.  In this study, we account for wage 
garnishment by including in the model the fraction of state household median income protected 
from garnishment, keeping in mind that all but the wealthiest working-age individuals derive 
virtually all of their income from wages and salaries (Burman and Kobes, 2003).
8 
Federal law sets a floor on monies collected via wage garnishment.  In all states, the 
District of Columbia, and U.S. territories, an employer may not garnish anymore than the lesser 
of 25 percent of an employee’s earnings or the amount by which an employee’s earnings exceed 
30 times the federal minimum wage, which in 2000 was $5.15 per hour.  Some states provide for 
even greater protection of employee’s wages.  For example, Texas, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina exempt all wages from garnishment, while Delaware, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and West Virginia allow individuals to protect 80 percent or more of their disposable income 
from garnishment.   
Surprisingly, Ararwal et al. (2003) find that the level of garnishment protection has a 
negative effect on the probability of a credit card holder becoming delinquent, but they do not 
find a statistically significant relationship between garnishment levels and the probability of 
formally filing for bankruptcy. Apilado, et al. ( 1978), Sullivan and Worden (1990), and Dawsey 
and Ausubel (2001), however, all find a negative association between personal bankruptcies and 
the share of income protected from garnishment. 
                                                 
8 In 2000, the year of data used in this study, when capital gains were at an all time high during the late 1990s stock 
market boom, those making less than $100,000 earned 70 – 80 percent of their income from wages and salaries, with 
the bulk of the remainder coming from IRA distributions and social security.  Thus for working age people in that 
income class, virtually all income comes in the form of wages and salaries. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
  11
Legal Gambling 
Legalized gambling has grown rapidly in the United States over the last two decades, 
spurred largely by the introduction of gaming on Indian reservations in the 1980s.  State law at 
the time severely restricted most types of gambling, although exemptions were often granted for 
state-sponsored gambling (i.e., lotteries) and charitable events (like “casino nights”).  Indian 
tribes believed that gambling could not be restricted or regulated on their reservations because 
state laws generally do not apply to Indian tribes or Indian people within their reservations.  The 
exception is when the applicability of state laws is expressly authorization by Congress, and 
Public Law 280 (1953) allows for state criminal laws to be enforced on reservations in some 
states.  There was some initial debate about the applicability of state gambling laws under Public 
Law 280.  A U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the issue (Cabazon v. California, 1987) sided largely 
with Indian tribes and subsequently opened the door to widespread Indian gaming.
9  Today there 
are over 300 Indian casinos across the United States. 
Commercial gaming expanded at about the same time as Indian gaming.  South Dakota 
legalized casino gambling in the historic town of Deadwood in 1989, and the State of Iowa 
quickly followed with the first riverboat casinos.  The following year, riverboat gambling was 
legalized in Illinois and Mississippi.  Today eleven states offer either land-based (6) or “floating” 
(6) commercial casino gaming.   
Casino gaming in some form (Indian or commercial) is allowed in 33 states.  In 1999, 
approximately $769 billion was wagered in the United States, encompassing all forms of 
commercial gaming, leading to gambling losses to consumers (or revenues to the gaming 
establishments) of roughly $59.4 billion, or about 0.64 percent of gross domestic product 
                                                 
9 The ruling essentially stated that if states allow any type of gaming, they must allow similar types of gaming on 
Indian reservations.  My interpretation of the basic argument is that in cases where gaming is allowed in some form 
in a state, restrictions on Indian gaming amount to regulation, while in cases where all types of gaming are illegal, 
restrictions on Indian gaming are a matter of enforcing state criminal laws, in which case Public Law 280 would 
seem to apply.  The current regulatory structure for Indian gaming is largely embodied in the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (P.L. 100-497, codified at 25 U.S.C. 2701). DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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(GDP).
10  By 2003, consumer gambling losses increased to $72.9 billion, suggesting that the total 
wager in that year was around $962 billion,
11 an increase of over 25 percent in four years.   
As shown in Figure 4, there is substantial variation in the geographic pattern and 
concentration of private and Indian casinos across the United States.  The heaviest concentrations 
of Indian casinos are, unsurprisingly, in the upper Midwest, on the West coast, and in the State of 
Oklahoma.  The largest concentrations of private casinos are in Atlantic City, Deadwood, SD, 
central Colorado, throughout the State of Nevada, and along the Mississippi river.  Very little 
gaming of any type is found in the eastern third of the country. 
The mechanism whereby gambling would lead to a greater likelihood of filing for 
bankruptcy is by raising debt levels relative to income.  In one of the first formal studies to look 
at the relationship between bankruptcy and gambling, Hira (1998) found that average annual net 
income is about a third lower for gamblers than for non-gamblers and that the mean total debt of 
gamblers is about 19 percent higher than the mean total debt of non-gamblers. 
Problem gambling has been shown to increase with the availability of gambling 
opportunities.  The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (1999), in a combined patron and 
telephone survey, found that the prevalence of “problem and pathological gambling” roughly 
doubles within 50 miles of a casino (vs. within 50 and 250 miles) (see also Goodman, 1995) 
(ix).
12  If bankruptcy is associated with problem gambling, therefore, bankruptcy also should be 
associated with proximity to gambling establishments.  The NORC report revealed that 19.2 
percent of “pathological gamblers” have filed for bankruptcy at least once, compared to 5.5 
percent for “low-risk gamblers” and 4.2 percent for non-gamblers.  Granted, pathological 
gamblers have personal characteristics that make them more likely to file for bankruptcy than 
non-gamblers even ignoring their gambling problem, but given those characteristics, the 
                                                 
10 Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC, “The Gross Annual Wager of the United States 2003.”  
11 The total wager value for 2003 was estimated by the author from the 2003 value for consumer gambling losses 
provided by Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC. 
12 The use of the terms “problem gambling” and “pathological gambling” reflect specifically the criteria set by the 
American Psychiatric Association.  For criteria, see http://www.ncpgambling.org/about_problem/ 
about_problem_timeline.asp. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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expected share who have ever filed for bankruptcy was only 10.8 percent, significantly less than 
the actual 19.2 percent figure for pathological gamblers.  In a study of gambling treatment in the 
State of Minnesota, Stinchfield and Winters (1996) found that 21 percent of 944 gamblers 
admitted for treatment had filed for bankruptcy.   
Empirical results from the existing literature on the relationship between gambling and 
personal bankruptcy are mixed.  Results from state-level time series regressions for New Jersey, 
Mississippi, and Nevada conducted by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (1999)  suggest that 
“gambling has no measurable impact on statewide bankruptcy rates” (54).  The Treasury study 
also found no impact when estimating panel regression using county-level data .  This result was 
echoed in the work of de la Viña and Bernstein (2002), who in a study examining 100 counties in 
36 states find no statistically significant evidence that bankruptcy filing rates are higher in casino 
and/or pari-mutual betting counties vis-à-vis non-gambling states.  Using a sample of 398 
counties from the casino states of Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Mississippi over a period of eight 
years, Thalheimer and Ali (2004) also fail to show a significant relationship between access to 
gambling establishments and personal bankruptcy filings.  Their measure of access to gambling 
for any given county was given by a gravity model:  ) 031 . 0 exp( d − = access , where d is the 
distance from the geographic centroid of the county to the relevant gaming establishment, and 
the decay parameter is based on the observation from another study (Illinois Gaming Board, 
1997) that 21 percent of riverboat casino visits are made by those who live at least 50 miles 
away.
13 
A limited number of studies have found a positive association between gambling and 
personal bankruptcy filings.  Nichols et al. (2000) compare bankruptcy filing rates in eight 
casino counties in Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, and Missouri  with corresponding counties with 
similar characteristics (by means of a cluster analysis) and find that the introduction of casino 
gambling was associated with a significant increase in bankruptcy rates in five of the counties 
                                                 
13 The authors argue that this implies that accessibility declines from 100 percent to 21 percent as distance increases 
from 0 to 50 miles, yielding a 3.1 percent compound rate of decline. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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and a significant decrease in one county.  There was no statistically significant relationship 
between bankruptcy filing rates and the introduction of casino gambling in the other two 
counties, but the relationship was positive.  A study by Barron et al. (2002) suggests that the 
elimination of casino gambling would have reduced bankruptcy filings by five percent in casino 
counties in 1998 and would have reduced the national filing rate by about one percent.   
The examination of the relationship between gambling and bankruptcy in this study 
improves on the existing literature firstly by including a full set of Indian gaming establishments 
while also including all counties in the United States.  Thalheimer and Ali (2004) did include 
Indian gaming locations in their analysis of 398 counties, but many Indian gaming 
establishments were likely missed.  For example, Figure 4 shows 44 Indian establishments 
spread throughout Oklahoma in 2000, whereas Thalheimer and Ali show 0 for 1997.  
Information from the Oklahoma Indian Affairs Commission suggests there were at least 10 
compacts with Indian tribes by 1996, the earliest being executed in 1992.
14  Further, the National 
Indian Gaming Commission asserts there were 36 Indian gambling establishments in Oklahoma 
in 1997.
15  Thalheimer and Ali likely were considering only class III casinos, which provide all 
types of gambling and were not legalized in Oklahoma until 2005.  However, the establishments 
existing in 1997 (and 2000) provided “fast-style class II gaming,” in which substantial amounts 
of money can be wagered.
16  If all available gambling establishments are not included in the 
analysis, the estimate of the relationship between gambling and bankruptcy rates would be biased 
towards zero. 
A second improvement upon the existing literature is an accounting for all forms of 
gambling.  In addition to Indian and commercial casinos, dummy variables are included to reflect 
the legality of card rooms and race tracks and the presence of a state lottery.   
                                                 
14 http://www.state.ok.us/~oiac/gaming.htm 
15 Personal correspondence on September 14, 2005. 
16 Ibid. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Finally, a novel formulation of accessibility to casino gambling is included in the study.  
Specifically, the variable used to pick up proximity to casinos is for each county the minimum 
distance from the geographic center of that county to the geographic center of a casino-
containing zip code.  This distance is determined by calculating the distance from the population 
center of each county to the center of each zip code that contains at least one casino, and then 
taking the minimum of all of those distances for each county.  This provides a measure that 
allows accessibility to change as distance varies, and the assumption is that the relationship 
decays in a linear fashion as distance increases.  Given mixed results in the past, it is important to 
bring another formulation to bear on the issue. 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
About 70 – 80 percent of new businesses fail in the first year, and of the remainder, half 
fail within five years.  Given these high failure rates, one might expect that entrepreneurs have 
relatively high bankruptcy rates.  In calendar year 2004, the latest date for which complete data 
are available, only 34,317 of approximately 1.6 million bankruptcy filings, or less than 2.2 
percent, were deemed to be business filings by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
17  However, Lawless 
and Warren (2005) find that these official reports significantly understate the actual number of 
business filings because self-employed people, small business owners, and independent 
contractors are likely to file for personal bankruptcy protection if they have a failed business 
undertaking.  Official reports put business filings at 2.3 percent of total filings in 2003.  In 
reality, as much as 18.6 percent of all bankruptcy filings in 2003 may have been due to business 
failures (the actual figure is more likely around 13.5 percent).  Thus, a significant number of 
personal bankruptcy filings (as much as 19 percent) are business filings, and an examination of 
the determinants of personal bankruptcy filing rates should account for this.   
Fay et al. (2002) find that an individual owning his own business is not any more or less 
likely to file for bankruptcy than individuals who do not own their own businesses.  As less 
                                                 
17 Data is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankrupt_f2table_dec2004.pdf (accessed August 23, 
2005). DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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direct evidence of a relationship between entrepreneurship and personal bankruptcy filing rates, 
Mathur (2005) finds that the decision to start a new business is positively related to own-state 
homestead exemptions and negatively related to neighboring states’ homestead exemptions, 
while the decision to close a small business is negatively related to own-state homestead 
exemptions and positively related to neighboring states’ homestead exemptions (see also Fan and 
White, 2003).  The findings suggest that homestead exemptions are an important consideration in 
the business start-up/closure decision, and hence also suggest that bankruptcy may be a factor. 
I include in the model the fraction of total employment that is made up of self-employed 
people.  If the hypothesis above is correct, higher self-employment rates, should be associated 
with higher bankruptcy filing rates.  I also include net firm births, which is total firm births less 
total firm deaths, per 10,000 residents as a measure of the environment for entrepreneurship in 
local areas.  A high number of firm births relative to firm deaths is indicative of an environment 
conducive to entrepreneurship and small business and should be associated with lower 
bankruptcy filing rates.  Net firm births may also reflect the general business climate. 
Economic and Social Factors and Healthcare 
VISA (1996) finds employment growth rates to be “the single most powerful coefficient 
explaining bankruptcy behavior” (13), although the unemployment rate does not have much 
predictive value.  White (1987) finds that a one percent increase in the county unemployment 
rate leads to an increase in Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings of approximately one-half of one 
percent, while higher unemployment rates, surprisingly, seem to lower the rate of Chapter 13 
filings.  In general results seem to be reversed in Chapter 7 and 13 filings in White’s study, 
which suggests that the variables affect chapter choice in addition to the decision to file for 
bankruptcy.  Numerous others have found a positive relationship between nonbusiness 
bankruptcy filing rates and the unemployment rate (see, e.g., Domowitz and Eovaldi,1993; 
Dawsey and Ausubel, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2003).   
Income has been shown to be a critical determinant of bankruptcy in a number of studies, 
but the effects are mixed and depend on how income enters the model.  Agarwal et al. (2003) and DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Fay et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between income and bankruptcy, while Dawsey and 
Ausubel (2001) find a positive relationship.   Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find income not to be 
a significant determinant of the probability of filing for bankruptcy, except when combined with 
home ownership. 
In 1995, for example, 32 percent of U.S. households in the lowest income decile had 
credit cards (Yoo, 1998).  That number increased steadily to 99 percent for the highest income 
decile.  The percentage for the U.S. as a whole was 75 percent.  Likewise, average credit card 
balances (for households with credit cards) increased steadily from $1,358 in the lowest income 
decile to $2,551 (roughly 90 percent higher) for the highest income decile.  Of course, given that 
average income in the top decile is ten times higher than average income in the bottom decile, 
lower income people, on average, have larger credit card balances relative to income.  
Another potentially important economic factor is the share of the population receiving 
public assistance.  People receiving public assistance are likely to have much less access to credit 
than others, which should be reflected in lower bankruptcy filing rates.  Further, the existence of 
financial support during times of hardship may reduce bankruptcy filings on the margin.  
Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) find a statistically significant negative relationship between per 
capita transfer payments and bankruptcy filing rates. 
Hospitals and doctors provide about $45 billion in uncompensated care each year, much 
of which is bad debt.
18  HCA, the largest hospital operator in the U.S., for example, reserves 12 
percent of revenues for bad debt.  Tenet Healthcare Corp., the second largest operator, reserves 
11 percent.  Unsurprisingly, these bad debts often arise from bankruptcy filings.   
Warren et al. (2000) evaluate responses from 1,974 survey participants and find that one 
out of four debtors identified injury or illness as a reason for filing for bankruptcy.  One third (in 
total) stated that they had substantial medical bills, defined as $1,000 or more in medical bills not 
                                                 
18 See “More Americans May Have Lost Medical Coverage for Fourth Year,” Bloomberg.com, August 30, 2005.  
Accessed September 30, 2005 at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid= 
aQNqUDzLGkRY&refer=us#. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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covered by insurance.  A more recent study by Himmelstein et al. (2005) has very similar 
findings.  Like the Warren et al. study, the Himmelstein et al. study finds that about one-quarter 
of the 1,771 personal bankruptcy filers surveyed named injury or illness as a specific reason for 
bankruptcy.  An additional quarter were found to have uncovered medical bills of at least $1,000.  
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find “high medical debt” to have the “greatest single impact of any 
household condition variables in raising the conditional probability of bankruptcy” (413).  
Specifically, they find that households with high medical debt have a probability of filing for 
bankruptcy greater than 28 times that of the baseline household. 
In an effort to account for the role of medical costs in bankruptcy filing rates, I include in 
the model the share of the county population without health insurance coverage. Agarwal et al. 
(2003) found a positive association between the lack of health insurance coverage and the 
probability of an individual filing for bankruptcy.  Also included in the model is the share of the 
population aged 21 – 64 that is disabled. 
Credit and Debt 
Clearly debt levels and access to credit are critical determinants of bankruptcy filing, as 
bankruptcy implies liabilities in excess of assets.  The proportion of debt that is unsecured is 
significantly higher among bankruptcy filers than among the population in general (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 1999; Sullivan et al., 1989).  Revolving debt in particular, 
especially credit card debt, seems to be positively correlated with bankruptcy filing (Dawsey and 
Ausubel, 2001; Domowitz and Sartain, 1999).  Existing research indicates that account balances 
and installment debt relative to income also are positively associated with income (Agarwal et 
al., 2003; VISA, 1996), although Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between bankruptcy and debt relative to income. 
Increased access to credit also has been found to be correlated with bankruptcy filing.  
VISA (1996) finds that bankruptcy filing is increasing in the number of credit card accounts, but 
they caution that the number of accounts per adult creates a redundancy with revolving debt as a 
percent of consumer installment credit, which is also included in the model.  On the other hand, DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
  19
Agarwal at al. (2001) finds that bankruptcy filings are decreasing in the overall credit limit.  
They also produce the expected result that bankruptcy filings are negatively associated with 
credit scores. 
Homes and Autos 
Conversations with attorneys suggest that excessive expenditures on autos are common 
among bankruptcy filings.
19  I include variables reflecting the average number of vehicles in a 
household and the proportion of total debt that is auto debt, on average, in the county.  
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find that a debtor who is not a home owner is about seven 
times more likely to file for bankruptcy than the average homeowner.  White (1987) finds a 
positive relationship between home ownership and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings, but does not 
reveal a statistically significant relationship between Chapter 7 filings and home ownership. 
Mortgage debt may be used to finance consumer spending by refinancing and cashing out 
equity.  Consumers, if they choose the right lender, can in some cases finance 125 percent of the 
value of their home.  According to the Freddie Mac website, in the second quarter of 2005, the 
latest date for which data are available, “74 percent of Freddie Mac-owned loans that were 
refinanced resulted in new mortgages with loan amounts that were at least five percent higher 
than the original mortgage balances.”
20  Controlling for mortgage debt, as done in this study, 
median home value serves as a good proxy for home equity, which should be negatively related 
to bankruptcy filing rates, given that home equity can be tapped for emergency spending and that 
negative equity often spurs bankruptcy.  VISA (1996) finds such a negative relationship 
empirically between median home prices and bankruptcy filing rates, but surprisingly, Domowitz 
and Eovaldi (1993) do not find a statistically significant relationship between homeowners’ 
equity and bankruptcy filings.    
                                                 
19 As are excessive expenditures on furniture, but data on furniture expenditures or related debt are not available at 
the county, or even state levels. 
20 Accessed September 13, 2005 at http://www.freddiemac.com/ news/archives/rates/2005/2qupb05.html. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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In this study we include not only median house value and mortgage debt (as a share of 
total debt, which is also included in the model), but also owner-occupancy rate, the vacancy rate 
of owner-occupied housing, and the share of owner-occupied dwellings carrying a mortgage.  As 
a measure of living expenses, we include median rent and median costs of owner-occupied 
housing. 
Demographics and Other Variables   
As in most studies of bankruptcy, demographics variables are included in the models here 
as additional controls.  Existing literature suggests that these controls are important.  White 
(1987) finds a positive association between the proportion of the population that is black and 
“Spanish” and Chapter 13 filings, but finds no relationship between percentage black and 
Chapter 7 filings and a negative relationship among the share that is Spanish and Chapter 7 
filings.  In the White study it is difficult to distinguish effects of race and ethnicity on bankruptcy 
filing and chapter choice; however, Domowitz et al. (1993) find a positive relationship between 
bankruptcy filings and the proportion of the population that is nonwhite.  I include a range of 
race and ethnicity variables in my models to account for potential effects on bankruptcy filings. 
Divorce often causes a substantial, immediate, and unanticipated reduction in income.  
This is true for women in particular, who are estimated to suffer a 30 percent decline in 
economic status in the first year following a divorce (Hoffman and Duncan, 1988).
21 Numerous 
studies of bankruptcy have found a statistically significant positive relationship between divorce 
and bankruptcy (White, 1987; Shiers and Williamson, 1987; Fay et al., 2002).  Domowitz and 
Eovaldi (1993) found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between divorce rates 
and bankruptcy filing rates.  Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find that people who are unmarried 
have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy than people who are married.  I include in the 
model the shares of the population in each county that are married, separated, divorced, and 
widowed, with never married being the left out variable. 
                                                 
21 Economic status is defined as the ratio of average income relative to needs. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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3.  Methodology and Empirical Results 
Let b
v
 be a vector of bankruptcy filing rates, X represent the matrix of explanatory 
variables discussed in Section 2, and θ
v
 be a vector of parameters.  The basic model (Model 1) is 
then given by  
 (1)  ε θ
v v v
+ = X b  
where  () Ω
2 σ ε ε = ′ v v
E .  The model is solved using least squares and White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent estimator. 
Exemptions 
 In Model 1, the coefficient on homestead exemption is statistically insignificant, which 
suggests that homestead exemptions have no impact on bankruptcy filing rates (Table 2).  
Alternatively, the zero coefficient may indicate either a dual causality or countervailing effects.  
The presumption underlying the empirical model is that homestead exemptions increase 
bankruptcy filing rates by reducing the cost of bankruptcy, which theoretically should produce a 
positive coefficient.  But it is possible that states with relatively high bankruptcy filing rates 
respond by lowering the homestead exemption.  If this is the case, the coefficient theoretically 
should be negative, which means the two forces may cancel each other out.  Further, since 
creditors tend to restrict lending to risky individuals in states with generous exemptions (Gropp 
et al., 1997; Grant, 2001; Berkowitz and White, 2004), high exemptions may lead to tighter 
credit restrictions and hence less borrowing and fewer bankruptcies.  In an effort to account for 
this potential endogeneity, a two-stage model was also estimated. 
The two-stage model begins with an estimation of homestead exemptions in the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia.  The dependent variable is the level of the homestead exemption in 
2000, in dollars.  Virtually all of the independent variables included in the model are statistically 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level or better (Table 3).  Poorer states, as measured by 
median household income, the poverty rate, and the share of households receiving some form of 
public assistance, tend to have lower homestead exemptions.  States with populations that are DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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older and states with larger families and greater shares of males and minorities tend to have more 
generous exemptions.  Surprisingly, both higher owner occupancy rates and home values tend to 
lower exemption levels.  The political tendencies of the state do not seem to have a significant 
effect on the levels of homestead exemptions.  These variables in total explained about 21 
percent of the total variation in homestead exemption levels across states.  Of course, as noted 
above, states do not change exemption levels very often, and the most important determinant of 
exemption levels in the Posner et al. (2001) study was the exemption level in 1920. 
The predicted values for state homestead exemptions generated in the first stage were 
utilized in the second stage.  Specifically, for each county, the homestead exemption variable is 
equal to the predicted value of the homestead exemption in the state in which it resides divided 
by the actual median home value in the county.  The values are restricted to be nonzero. 
Because a generated regressor is used in the second stage, t-statistics are calculated using 
bootstrapped standard errors, following Efron (1979) and as described in Greene (1993).  Least 
squares estimation of (1) results in an estimated parameter vector θ ˆ  and a residual vector ε ): 
(2)  ε ˆ ˆ + = θ X b  






2 1 L  are then obtained by sampling n 
observations from X, with replacement, and reestimating the model B times.  The estimated 
asymptotic covariance is then 
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The two-stage model is presented in Table 2 as Model 2. 
For most variables the results in Models 1 and 2 are virtually identical.  For homestead 
exemptions, however, the coefficient is now positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence 
level.  The value of 0.68 suggests that for every one percentage point increase in the share of the 
median house value covered by the homestead exemption, bankruptcy filing rates increase by 
0.68 per 10,000 households in the county.  An exemption of 100 percent of median house value 
would thus yield 35 additional bankruptcies per 10,000 households in that county relative to a DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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county in which the state exemption is only 50 percent of the median house value.  The average 
county had roughly 100 personal bankruptcies per 10,000 households in 2000 (the median had 
91), so this would represent a 35 percent increase in the bankruptcy filing rate.   
Social Stigma 
 I attempt to get at the role of stigma in explaining variation in bankruptcy filing rates in 
multiple ways.  The first way is by accounting for regional tastes for bankruptcy.  The inclusion 
of a set of dummy variables representing the eight BEA regions reveals a marked regional 
pattern (Table 2, Model 3).
22  Relative to counties in New England, which is the left-out region 
in the model, counties in the Mid-Atlantic, Great Lakes, Southeast, and Rocky Mountain regions 
have significantly higher bankruptcy filing rates, all else equal.  The bankruptcy filing rates in 
counties in the Plains, Southwest, and West regions are not significantly different from those 
with similar characteristics in the Northeast.  This result suggests that bankruptcy filers may face 
greater stigma in these regions and in the Northeast than in the rest of the country.   
An additional way I account for geographic differences is with a spatial autoregressive 
model.  Let D be an NxN matrix where  
(4)  ()
2
, / 000 , 000 , 1 , j i d j i D = , 
D(i,j) is the row i column j element of D, N is the total number of counties, and di,j is the arc 
distance between the geographic centroid of county i and the geographic centroid of county j.  
Letting ρ be a scalar, the spatial autoregressive model is given by 
(5)  ( ) I D X
2 , 0 ~ , σ ε ε ρ θ
v v v v v v
N b b + + =  
(5) is solved for θ
v
and ρ by the method of maximum likelihood.   
The parameter ρ is a measure of the degree that the bankruptcy filing rate in any county i 
depends on the bankruptcy filing rates of all other counties, where the strength of the relationship 
between filing rates in any two counties declines quadratic ally with the distance between them.  
The spatial autoregressive term estimated in Model 4 (Table 2) is positive and statistically 
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significant at the 99 percent confidence level, which is indicative of stigma effects: a given 
county’s bankruptcy filing rate is higher the higher is its neighbors’ bankruptcy filing rates. 
It has been suggested that relatively high bankruptcy filing rates among younger cohorts 
is indicative of declining stigma, the assumption being that social mores are declining over time.  
My results show that bankruptcy filing rates are lower the greater the proportion of the 
population that is aged 55 – 64, which is consistent with this view.   Inconsistent with this view, 
however, is that bankruptcy filing rates increase with the share of the population that is aged 75 – 
84.  These results actually are more consistent with stigma being a generational phenomenon 
rather than chronological, which is also consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 3. 
Perhaps the best proxy for stigma is the data on religious adherence.  My results (Models 
1 – 4) suggest that bankruptcy filing rates are lower the greater the concentrations of Muslims, 
Eastern religion adherents, and Unitarian Universalists, and bankruptcy filing rates are higher the 
greater the concentrations of Jews and Christians, relative to the non-religious share of the 
population.  These results are entirely consistent with the emphasis on repayment of debts in 
Islam, avoidance of injury to others in the Eastern religions, and forgiveness in the Christian 
religions, as well as with the Jubilee concept in Judaism. 
While clearly not a direct measure of stigma, the confluence of effects of geographic 
variables, the age distribution, and data on religious adherence is highly suggestive of a strong 
role for stigma in the determination of bankruptcy filing rates. 
In the remainder of the section, results from Model 3 are utilized in the discussion, 
keeping in mind that for any given variable, coefficient values may differ across specification.  
For most variables, these differences in values are negligible. 
Wage Garnishment 
  As expected, the greater the protection given to wages, the lower the bankruptcy filing 
rate.  Specifically, the number of bankruptcies per 10,000 households decreases roughly one-to-
one for every one percentage point increase in the proportion of state household median income 
protected from garnishment. DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Legal Gambling 
Minimum distance to a casino has a statistically significant negative effect on non-
business bankruptcy filing rates, meaning that the further a county centroid is from the nearest 
(legal) casino, the lower is the filing rate.  Specifically, an additional 100-mile distance from a 
casino results in 4.3 fewer bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households, or given that the average 
number of bankruptcies per county is 100, roughly four percent of filings in the average county.  
Counties in states where card rooms are legal on average have 11 more bankruptcy filings than 
counties in states where card rooms are illegal.  Surprisingly, the availability of race track 
gambling and a state lottery reduced filing rates compared to counties in states without race 
tracks and state lotteries.  Race track betting is legal in 42 states, while 33 states have state 
lotteries, so there was little variation in the data, especially given that these are state-level 
variables. 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
  Both the self-employment rate and net firm births (firm births less firm deaths) are 
negatively related to bankruptcy filing rates.  A one percentage point higher self-employment 
rate is associated with 4.4 fewer bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households, on average, which 
conflicts with the expectation that higher self-employment rates would be associated with 
increased bankruptcy filing rates.  10 additional net firm births are associated with roughly 2.6 
additional bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households, suggesting, as expected, that greater 
business success engenders lower bankruptcy filing rates.  
Economic and Social Factors and Health Care 
The employment rate is negatively related to bankruptcy filing rates, as expected.  A one 
percentage point difference in the employment rate is associated with about 0.8 less bankruptcy 
filings per 10,000 households, a change of less than one percent for the average county.  
Although this effect seems small on the surface, employment rates across counties varied from 
23.8 percent to 84.6 percent in 2000.  The mean employment rate was  57.4 percent and the 
standard deviation was 7.5 percent, which means that a county one standard deviation up from DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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the mean would incur roughly 6 fewer bankruptcies than the county with the mean employment 
rate. 
Previous studies generally have included the level of income in individual studies or the 
level of median or average income in aggregate studies, with a quadratic term in some cases, and 
the results have been mixed.  I include the entire distribution of income, and the results suggest 
that bankruptcy filing rates likely rise with income initially (from very low income), drop 
slightly in the middle income range, then spike at the $50,000 – $75,000 range before declining 
steadily with higher levels of income (Figure 5).  Very low bankruptcy filing rates would be 
expected in the lowest income ranges because there is little access to credit, and therefore less 
borrowing.  At higher income levels, bankruptcy filing rates increase with much better access to 
credit but relatively moderate incomes.  At some point, at the $50,000 –  $75,000 range in this 
model, bankruptcy filing rates begin to decline with a reduced need to borrow relative to income. 
Of course, these results reflect proportions of the population that are in the various 
income ranges.  The assumption is that these proportions mirror closely the distribution of filers.  
In fact, Rodríguez et al. (2002), in a study using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, show 
that the income quintile with the highest bankruptcy filing rate is the third quintile, which in 
2000 included households with income in the range of $33,006 to $52,272,
23 which is consistent 
with this view.  Nevertheless, county income distributions may reflect other phenomena besides 
the income distribution of bankruptcy filings.  For example, any individual low income person 
may be more likely to file for bankruptcy if he lives in a high income area than if he lives in a 
low income area if there is pressure to “keep up with the Joneses.”   
Bankruptcy filing rates are higher the greater the proportion of the population receiving 
public assistance.  This result is surprising in that public support in times of financial crisis 
would presumably forestall bankruptcy filings that might otherwise occur.  On the other hand, 
controls for income are included in the model, and the receipt of public assistance may for some 
                                                 
23 Data on limits of income quintiles for 2000 are from the U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables – 
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people (but certainly not all) reflect poor financial decision making and little capacity for 
climbing out of financial messes.  Moreover, a large proportion of the population receiving 
public assistance may be indicative of underlying economic crises in the county. 
As expected, bankruptcy filing rates are higher the greater the share of the population 
without health insurance and the larger the share that is disabled.  Specifically, a one percentage 
point higher share of the population without health insurance is associated with 0.9 more 
bankruptcies per 10,000 households.  These shares ranged from 7.4 percent to 24.2 percent in 
2000.  A one percentage increase in the share of the 21 – 64 population that is disabled, which 
ranged from 5.7 percent to 45.6 percent in 2000, is associated with 1.5 additional bankruptcies 
per 10,000 households. 
Credit and Debt 
  Results suggest that debt loads are an important factor in explaining bankruptcy filing 
rates, but measures of access to credit, such as the number of new accounts and credit cards per 
capita are not statistically significant explanatory factors.  Total debt to income is positively 
related to bankruptcy filing rates, but the magnitude is quite small at less than 0.2 filings per 
10,000 households for every additional point in the debt to income ratio.  The coefficient on the 
past due index is positive and fairly substantial.  A one unit higher past due index, which ranges 
from 0.7 to 48.9, is associated with 1.6 additional bankruptcies per 10,000 households. 
Homes and Autos 
  As expected, significant spending on autos is associated with higher bankruptcy filing 
rates.  A one percentage point higher share of the population with more than two vehicles is 
associated with 1.4 additional bankruptcies per 10,000 households, while greater ratios of auto 
debt to total debt are related to higher bankruptcy filing rates in roughly one-to-one fashion. 
  As in existing literature I find that higher rates of home ownership generate lower 
bankruptcy filing rates.  Specifically, a county with a one percentage point higher owner 
occupancy rate has, on average, 0.8 fewer bankruptcy per 10,000 households.  However, owner 
occupancy rates across counties are highly concentrated around the mean of 74 percent (Table DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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1).  Also supporting the literature is that my results suggest that home equity is associated with 
lower bankruptcy filing rates.  Specifically, median house value has a statistically significant 
positive coefficient, while the share of owner-occupied homes with mortgages, controlling for 
the owner occupancy rate, is positively correlated with bankruptcy filing rates.  The vacancy rate 
of owner-occupied dwellings does not appear to affect bankruptcy filing rates.  Higher costs of 
home ownership are associated with higher bankruptcy rates, but median rent does not seem to 
affect bankruptcy filing rates. 
Demographics and Other Variables 
In terms of race, relative to the share of the population that is white, Black and 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander shares of the population are positively correlated with bankruptcy 
filing rates, while proportions that are American Indian, Asian, or “Other Race” are negatively 
correlated with bankruptcy filing rates.  The results on black share of the population are 
consistent with existing literature, which has little to say about other races.   
As expected, the share of the population that is divorced is positively correlated with 
bankruptcy filing rates.  Specifically, a one percentage point higher share of the population that 
is divorced is associated with 7.8 more bankruptcies per 10,000 households, which is substantial 
even though county divorce rates are highly concentrated around their mean value (Table 1).  
Married households also have higher filing rates than never married households.  Domowitz and 
Sartain (1999) find that people who are unmarried have a higher probability of filing for 
bankruptcy than people who are married.  My results are not inconsistent with this finding in the 
sense that in the Domowitz and Sartain analysis, divorced people were included in the unmarried 
category, while the comparative (and left out) category here is never married.  Surprisingly, the 
share of the population that is separated is negatively associated with bankruptcy filings, even 
though separation is known to cause substantial financial strain.  A possible explanation for this 
unlikely finding is that people in the throes of a marital dissolution are unlikely to want to deal 
with bankruptcy inconveniences at such a time in their lives, and those in severe financial DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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distress will put off filing as long as possible.  The share of the population that is widowed does 
not have a statistically significant impact on bankruptcy filing rates. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  This paper analyzes a variety of potential determinants of bankruptcy filing rates.  
Proximity to gambling establishments was found to be associated with higher bankruptcy filing 
rates.  The use of an innovative, and I believe much improved, measure of proximity helps to 
shed light on a still unresolved issue.  Homestead exemptions were found to be a substantial 
determinant of bankruptcy filing rates, once controls for endogeneity were included in the model.  
This finding suggests that the weak relationship between homestead exemptions and bankruptcy 
filing rates found in much of the existing literature may be more of an econometric issue than a 
substantive issue.  Another important policy variable, the share of wages protected from 
garnishment, was shown to be a significant factor in the determination of bankruptcy filing rates 
as well, and the results support the conceptual view that wage garnishment spurs bankruptcy 
filing.  Data on religious adherence was incorporated in the model in an effort to account for the 
role of stigma in explaining bankruptcy filing rates.  I believe that the religion variables included 
in this study are to date the closest proxy to stigma that have been used in bankruptcy studies.  
Further, results from regional dummy variable and spatial autoregressive models bring new 
evidence to bear on the stigma issue, as well as related spatial issues, and the inclusion of the 
entire age distribution, rather than median age, provides more informative results on the role of 
age in determining bankruptcy filing rates.  Numerous other variables also were included to 
provide results from the most comprehensive model of bankruptcy filing rates to date in terms of 
the number of potential factors investigated. 
The new bankruptcy law likely will have some effect on filing rates by curbing abuses 
and forcing more petitioners into a reorganization plan that requires them to pay part of their 
debts.  This study suggests that exemption and garnishment laws also should be evaluated to 
ensure that consumers are offered some protection and a fresh start without being given too DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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much incentive to engage in risky financial behavior that may lead to bankruptcy.  But efforts to 
change consumer behavior through education likely will have the greatest impact, as many of the 
factors shown to affect bankruptcy filing rates, such as gambling, debt composition, home 
ownership, and prompt payment of bills, are reflections of financial decisions, and good 
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Figure 2: Bankruptcy Filing Rates by County, United States, 2000 
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Figure 4: Gambling in the United States, 2000 
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Table 1: Data Sources 
Variable Source 
Religion  Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB), Religious 
Congregations and Memberships in the United States: 2000, Nashville TN, 
Glenmary Research Center, 2002. 
Education  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Age Distribution  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Race  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Income  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Social 
     Households w/ Public Assistance 
     Disabled Population, 21 – 64 
     No Health Insurance 
 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement 
Marital Status  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports 
Housing 
     Median House Value 
     Median Costs, OOCC Housing 
     Median Rent 
     Owner-Occupany Rate 
     Vacancy Rate, OOCC Housing 
     OOCC Housing, % w/ Mortgage 
     Mortgage Debt / Total Debt 
 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Trendata, TransUnion LLC 
Vehicles 
     Number in Households 
     Auto Debt / Total Debt 
 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 
Trendata, TransUnion LLC 
Economy 
     Employment Rate 
     Self-Employment Rate 
      
     Net Firm Births 
 
Annual Statistical Supplement, 2000, U.S. Social Security Administration 
(www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2000, accessed July 
1, 2005). 
Unpublished data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1989 – 2000 Business 
Information Tracking Series. 
Debt Management  Trendata, Transunion LLC 
Gaming 




     Lottery, Card Rooms, and Race 
Tracks 
 
Author’s calculation using data from the National Indian Gaming Commission 
(www.nigc.gov), various tribal web sites, calls to tribal contacts, 
various state gaming agency compliance reports, and unpublished data 
provided by Casino City Press. 
“Gaming Activities,” Internal Revenue Service (www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small/industries/article/0,,id=99639,00.html, accessed on June 3, 
2005). 
State Law  Legal codes of the 50 states and the District of Columbia DRAFT.  Please do not distribute without permission from the author. 
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Mid Atlantic     25.617
*** 
(5.219)   
Great Lakes     6.499 
(1.328)   
Plains    0.208 
(0.044)   
Southeast    17.28
*** 
(4.017)   
Southwest    6.918 
(1.297)   
Rocky Mountain     12.24
** 


















West/Pacific    4.119 
(1.096)   
  ρ      0.528
*** 
(18.92) 
 Adj.  R
2 0.5169  0.5174  0.5244  0.5137 
t-statistics are in parentheses  
***, 
**, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
† indicates t-statistics are computed with bootstrapped standard errors.                          (Continued on next page) 




Table 3: Results, Homestead Exemptions 
Variable  Parameter Value 
(t-statistic)  Variable  Parameter Value 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  - 7,796,626
* 
(- 1.733)  Percent White  - 5,853
* 
(- 1.844) 
Poverty Rate  - 140,452
*** 
(- 2.891)  Average Family Size  1,770,668
*** 
(3.045) 
Median House Value  - 8.062
*** 
(- 3.059)  Household Median Income  - 32.52
* 
(- 1.905) 














(1.811)  Owner-Occupany Rate  - 21,184
* 
(- 1.954) 
Median Age  76,621
*** 
(2.813)  Percent GOP  - 14,540 
(- 1.406) 
Adjusted R
2 0.2063  No.  Observations  51 
***, 
**, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 